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1 Introduction
Bangladesh is commonly cited as among the most
vulnerable countries to the impacts of climate
change (Huq and Ayers 2007; Parry et al. 2007;
Harmeling 2011). The country has made
significant progress in poverty reduction and
economic growth in recent years, but more than
50 million people still live in poverty with weak
governance and corruption is widespread, limiting
the capacity to cope with and adapt to climate-
related shocks and stresses. Current disaster events
can be an example to illustrate the country’s
vulnerability to climate change; more than
50 million people are affected by disaster events
every five years. The country’s long coastline is
exposed to severe cyclones on an average of every
three years. Annually, approximately one-quarter
of the country is inundated, while the 1998 flood
inundated up to 61 per cent of the country,
rendering 45 million people homeless.
Nevertheless, Bangladesh has developed
significant knowledge, policy and institutional
defences against disaster events, evidenced by
dramatic reductions in the number of fatalities
during disaster events in the past two decades.
The occurrence of two national floods in July and
Cyclone Sidr in November 2007 sparked an
intensification of efforts to tackle climate change
and disaster impacts in Bangladesh. This was
underpinned by the recognition that climate
change posed a serious threat to Bangladesh’s
goal of becoming a middle-income country by
2021 (GoB 2006). Nationally, the post-2007
efforts were spearheaded by the formulation by
the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) of its
Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan
(BCCSAP) and establishment of a trust fund for
its implementation to be financed by both the
national government and international donors.
This planning process has received considerable
attention for two reasons. First, that the
planning process and its implementation will
determine the future sustainability of
development in a highly climate-vulnerable
country. Second, that Bangladesh is linked to and
plays a vital role in international climate change
diplomacy and politics.
The process and content of the post-2007 plans
are considerably different in nature and scope
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from previous climate change-related initiatives,
such as the National Adaptation Programme of
Action (NAPA) that was formulated under the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) in 2005. While the NAPA considered
only urgent and immediate priorities for
adaptation, the BCCSAP is more comprehensive
and focused on medium and long-term actions
through pillars that committed Bangladesh to
action across the areas of the UNFCCC post-
2012 negotiations: long-term cooperative action
on emissions reduction, adaptation, mitigation,
technology development and transfer and
financing. Additionally, while the NAPA
primarily engaged sector-based line ministries,
the BCCSAP process also drew in the more
powerful Ministries of Finance, Planning and the
Prime Minister’s Office.
This significant shift in climate change planning
was influenced by a set of transformations in
ideas, knowledge, actors and incentives in the
post-NAPA years. These include:
z The influence of international climate change
politics over national processes;
z The growing political awareness and
commitment for action on climate change in
Bangladesh;
z The influence of contested ideas and
knowledge around tackling climate change;
z The emergence of new actors joining with
established environmentalists and their
interplay in the decision-making;
z The incentives created by an expectation of
significant climate change-related funding.
While there is now significant understanding of
the need for transitions to low carbon and climate
resilient development, there is little experience
in the change process required for their delivery.
A growing body of knowledge in recent years has
explored policy options and change processes in
industrialised and rapidly industrialising
countries (Giddens 2009; Helm and Hepburn
2010; Boykoff 2010), but the political economy of
building resilient development at national level in
developing countries remains an area with
significant knowledge gaps.
This article examines the political economy of
contemporary climate change planning processes
in Bangladesh. Centring on the BCCSAP, the
study links this process to related financing
mechanisms, exploring the role of ideas,
ideology, power configuration between actors and
their incentives in shaping the BCCSAP process
and content. The study is based on 60 interviews
with key actors concerned in the Bangladesh
climate change planning process. The research
team provided all interviewees the guarantee of
anonymity. These interviews were combined with
a review of formal and informal documents,
including government notifications, meeting
minutes, formal publications, newspaper
clippings and press releases. The study findings
are not only beneficial for Bangladeshi
policymakers, researchers and the public but also
other climate-vulnerable countries pursuing
similar planning processes.
2 The BCCSAP and its development
The BCCSAP was originally developed under the
leadership of a caretaker government in
Bangladesh, which came into power on 11
January 2007 and lasted until 6 January 2009.
The formal process of BCCSAP formulation
began in March 2008 with a first draft published
in September 2008 (MOEF 2008). Following the
general election in January 2009, the newly
formed coalition government led by the Awami
League (AL) revised and launched the current
version of the BCCSAP in March 2009 (MOEF
2009). Table 1 highlights the main differences
between the two drafts. Three distinct phases
can be distinguished in the development of the
BCCSAP, each with distinct leadership, actors
and dynamics.
Phase one formally began in November 2007 when
the Department of the Environment (DoE)
signed a Terms of Reference with the UK
Department for International Development
(DFID) for a policy support grant to develop the
BCCSAP. Crucially, this phase established the
character of the formulation process by locating it
within the environmental arena. According to
DFID Bangladesh staff, the DoE was chosen
because it was the main nodal point for climate
change activities; the DFID and UNDP-funded
Comprehensive Disaster Management
Programme had previously established a Climate
Change Cell within the DoE. A staff member of
the Climate Change Cell was assigned to design
the programme, while the Economic Relations
Division (ERD) of the GoB was asked to produce
a financing mechanism for implementation of the
BCCSAP. A document was produced to be shared
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with stakeholders by March 2008. The Ministry of
Environment and Forests (MoEF) and a few
influential climate change experts not involved in
this process questioned whether the DoE had the
‘mandate’ and ‘capacity to formulate a strategy of
a multi-sectoral nature’. MoEF later assigned a
group of experts to formulate the Strategy (DFID
and DoE pers. comm. 2010).
Phase two is the core BCCSAP formulation
process, which began in March 2008 and marked
the launch of the first version of the BCCSAP in
London at the ‘UK-Bangladesh Climate
Conference’ in September 2008. GoB announced
an allocation of 300 Crore Taka (US$100m) per
annum from the national budget to implement
the BCCSAP, which the UK matched through a
pledge of £75 million over five years. At the same
time, the UK floated the idea of using a World
Bank (WB)-led Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)
to govern, manage and mobilise further finance.
This phase saw a growth in debates and
campaigns nationally and internationally over the
process and content of BCCSAP, as well as the
increasing involvement of the WB in the MDTF.
The final phase began when the AL-led coalition
government engaged at the debate over the
BCCSAP and MDTF at the beginning of 2009.
The government set up a ministerial committee
led by the Planning Minister to redevelop the
BCCSAP, which highlighted key gaps in the
document (GoB 2009). The Cabinet put together
a six-member review committee comprised of
GoB representatives; two previous members
involved in phase two and two new experts. The
committee compiled a redrafted BCCSAP in
August which the cabinet approved and renamed
as the BCCSAP 2009 in October.
The proposed governance and management of
the MDTF designed to finance implementation
of the BSCCAP sharply divided the actors and
created a dispute between GoB and donors, most
notably the EU and DFID. GoB argued that it
had capacity to manage the fund, while donors
favoured the World Bank as a managing agency
on the grounds that this would help in mobilising
more funds as well as manage fiduciary risk.
While these differences were pronounced, both
GoB and donor views reflect an institutional
ideological perspective that focuses attention on
establishing adequate governance of funds as the
primary route to their effective use. By contrast,
the NGO and civil society organisation (CSO)
campaign groups reflected a more justice-based
ideology, campaigning on the issues of
sovereignty, equity, access and principles of
international cooperation as compensation
rather than charity. (Mukta and Hossain 2008;
Shamsuddoha and Chowdhury 2009; IDC 2010).
A compromise position was found at the
Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) meeting
in February 2010, where the GoB ‘confirmed their
desire to establish a climate change multi-donor
trust fund… led by the Government with the
World Bank providing technical back-stopping and
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Table 1 Major changes BCCSAP 2008 and BCCSAP 2009
Version BCCSAP 2008 BCCSAP 2009
Key drivers Previous technical studies and plans Political commitment of the Awami League 
including 2005 NAPA government
Key principles (a) Wide range of funding sources (a) Funding should be grant only
(b) Linking adaptation and mitigation: (b) Low carbon development without
low carbon development as part of compromising economic growth
climate resilient development (c) Recognising the historical responsibility of
developed countries
Programme of action 120 programmes proposed. No significant change in the distribution of
Predominantly techno-managerial actions but additional programmes including 
actions including physical infrastructure, planned migration, investment in women’s 
technical research and development, capacity building and river dredging
technology development, and 
institutional capacity. Only nine 
programmes for human capacity 
development
fiduciary management’ (Foster 2010). The
development of implementation modalities will be
crucial to the negotiation between these different
ideological positions (see Box 1).
3 Actors and ideology
3.1 Actors in the BCCSAP
A wide range of actors and groups were involved
in the different phases of the BCCSAP
formulation process and subsequent debates.
Interviews and documentary review for this
research shows how the participation of the
political parties in climate change issues remained
almost nonexistent at the beginning of the
BCCSAP formulation process, with no visible
party positions. Only the AL included climate
change in their election manifesto for the general
election of 2009 (Box 2) and climate change
remains at the periphery of the domestic politics.
The civil bureaucrats were a consistently powerful
actor over the entire period of formulation. This
is not unusual in policymaking processes, as they
bear the sole responsibility in the preparation of
major policies (Aminuzzaman 2002). During
phase one and two, they assigned experts and
approved their inputs for the BCCSAP. In phase
three, they played a significant role in the
negotiations with donors on the governance and
management of the MDTF.
The community of experts in the BCCSAP process
comprised of the country’s senior economists,
engineers and environmentalists. The individuals
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Box 1 Disputes over Bangladesh climate change trust funds
Until recently, the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF) was called the
Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). The MDTF originated in the latter half of 2008 when
the UK government pledged a grant amounting to £75 million over the next five years to
implement the BCCSAP. The signed communiqué between the UK and Bangladesh
governments invoked the Paris Declaration principles in aligning aid with national
priorities. Since the UK’s aid policy towards Bangladesh does not allow direct transfer to
GoB’s account, the MDTF was pursued as the mechanism to manage fiduciary risk. Since
the creation of new institutions takes time, according to DFID, the WB was suggested as a
fund manager. Since then, the WB’s role in the MDTF has created significant national and
international disputes between GoB, civil society, NGOs and donors.
The key areas of dispute over funding include:
z The GoB argued that it has the capacity for robust fiduciary management of the fund
and wanted donors to transfer the fund directly to the government. The donors wanted
the WB to provide the financial management of the MDTF, while the GoB wanted the
WB to provide only technical back-stopping and transfer of management skills.
z Out of the US$98 million mobilised for the MDTF until December 2008, its draft
concept note allocated US$8 million for the WB’s execution (for management, project
appraisal, and supervision and capacity building), which was criticised by the campaign
group as ‘high’ and a conflict of interest.
z GoB and campaign groups argued that the WB’s role in the MDTF opposed the
principles of ownership and alignment enshrined in the UNFCCC and in the 2005 Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
z The GoB proposed to establish an independent, three-tier governance structure, while
the donors wanted to appoint the WB as an independent trustee to the fund. The WB
wanted the MDTF to be governed by the terms of the legal agreement between the WB
and the donors.
z In accounting for the sources of finance, the major concern, particularly from the
campaign groups, was whether the bilateral fund pledges from industrialised ‘Annex 1’
countries to the MDTF would be new and additional to the existing ODA commitments
or not. The civil society organisations argued that the use of existing aid commitments
was a breach of the financing commitment made under the UNFCCC.
in this actor group formed a community through
their historic engagement in the technical issues of
environment, water management and poverty.
Although fairly small in number and based in the
capital, they played important roles in past
environment-related policy and strategy-making
process. They have strong views about what to do,
as well as sharp differences over some policy issues,
such as the effectiveness of infrastructural
solutions for flood management. This group shares
a common incentive, driven by a desire to retain
their leadership over climate change issues, and is
closely linked to international institutions. Many of
them saw a ‘window of opportunity’ to engage
themselves in this historic process as well as wanted
to see their ideas reflected in the document.
The third influential set of actors is the
internationally connected campaign groups. Two major
groups that have played an influential role in the
second and third phase of the BCCSAP process
are the Equity and Justice Working Group
(www.equitybd.org), which is a coalition of
national NGOs, and the Oxfam-led Campaign for
Sustainable Rural Livelihood (CSRL). Networked
with global climate justice campaigns, they
mobilised significant public opinion around
climate change issues by organising national and
international events involving influential
politicians inside and outside the government in
the UK and Bangladesh. Unlike any other
policymaking process (Aminuzzaman 2002), the
role of national and international NGOs was less
visible in the BCCSAP planning process.
The fourth group is the community of bilateral and
multilateral donors. The historic role of donors in
injecting ideas in public policy has increased
significantly in recent years, despite a reduction
in aid as a proportion of GDP (Aminuzzaman
2002; Duncan et al. 2002; Sobhan 2002; Quibria
and Ahmad 2007), with the World Bank
prominent in terms of economic reforms. Among
the bilateral agencies, DFID is the largest donor
to Bangladesh, and provided financial assistance
to GoB to formulate the BCCSAP (IDC 2010).
DFID played the lead role in shaping and
negotiating the role of the MDTF (UK and GoB).
Bangladesh has a well-developed and free media
that played a significant role in shaping public
opinion and debate over climate change issues,
especially in promoting the idea that the MDTF
should be managed by the government by
publicising the policy positions of the campaign
groups.
The direct involvement of the most vulnerable
people was largely absent in the process of
BCCSAP formulation (Hossain 2009; New Age
2008). Many of the key members of the drafting
committee believed that the communities’ views
have been reflected in the BCCSAP, as it took
note of the learning from the NAPA regional
consultation meetings, despite the limitations of
this process noted elsewhere (Huq and Khan
2006). During the second phase, such
representation may be assumed through the
participation of invited NGOs and members
from civil society in three consultative meetings
organised in Dhaka (along with academics, local
and national government and donors). However,
their role was limited to raising issues and
commenting on the draft.
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Box 2 Climate change text from the Awami League 2009 election manifesto
‘All measures will be taken to protect Bangladesh – including planned migration abroad –
from the adverse effects of climate change and global warming’. (Awami League 2009
election manifesto, p. 21, para. 2)
‘An integrated policy and plan will be formulated to protect the country from the adverse
effects of global warming… Projects will be undertaken for river dredging, water
conservation, flood control, prevention of river erosion and protection of forestry. Attempts
will also be made for restoring and maintaining ecological balance. Initiatives will be taken
to implement the Ganges barrage project to expand irrigation facilities, prevent salinity
and to solve the problem of scarcity of sweet water in the Sundarban region’. (Awami
League 2009 election manifesto, p. 10, para. 5)
Source www.albd.org/autoalbd/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=367
&Itemid=1 (accessed 8 March 2011).
3.2 The role of ideology in shaping positions
The research distilled a range of different drivers
for climate change planning in Bangladesh,
based on ideological belief systems that animate
social and political action (see Clapp and
Dauvergne 2005).
The pluralists include the bureaucrats and expert
community. They assume that the liberal planning
process creates an environment for all interest
groups in the society to influence the planning
process. As a consequence, specific measures may
not be necessary to involve the most vulnerable
section of the community. As a result, involvement
of local NGOs was seen as a substitute for the
direct involvement of vulnerable communities.
The climate justice ideology is a descendent of the
trade justice ideology and is the most influential
ideology shared by individuals and institutional
actors within governments, campaigns, media,
some of the community of experts and donors. The
key interpretation of the ideology is of Bangladesh’s
right to new and additional international resources
to tackle the causes and effects of climate change,
with those for adaptation in particular regarded as
‘compensation’ for damages caused by emissions
largely generated elsewhere (Farber 2006; Daily
Star 2008a; Okereke 2010). 
The leftwing ideology, although less visible, has a
historical root in opposing the role of
international financial institutions in domestic
policymaking. Journalists in Bangladesh who
raised the issues on the BCCSAP process and
content in the second phase, are known as ‘left-
leaning’. Bangladesh had a historical presence of
strong left-leaning political parties until the fall of
the Soviet Union. The socialist character of AL
and the ruling coalition is shaped by the joining of
influential leftists in AL, as well as left parties in
the coalition. Many experts interviewed by the
research team believed that the coalition
government’s opposition to the WB role in the
MDTF and the refusal of loans for climate change
until 2009 was a reflection of both the leftist and
climate justice ideologies. Some of the biggest
contemporary campaigns, especially in relation to
natural resources and energy, are organised by left
political parties and intellectuals.
The faith-based drivers are found especially within
the Islamic and Christian traditions. Christian
ethics have heavily underpinned notions of
climate justice both internationally and in
Bangladesh, particularly through the NGO
movement and its advocacy. While Islamist
ideology has been influential in translating major
policy ideas, such as education policy, land rights
and women’s issues in Bangladesh, they played a
very limited role in the BCCSAP process.
Market liberals have been crucial in promoting the
idea that a mix of grants and loans is an
essential element to finance efforts to manage
climate change. This ideology is shared by the
multilateral development banks, government
bureaucrats and community of experts. Aid
effectiveness as a global standard is the most
important component of the management and
governance of climate change grants.
The combination of the pluralist, market
liberalist, climate justice and left ideologies had
an influence in raising debates throughout the
BCCSAP process. As an outcome, the climate
justice ideology resulted in a prolonged
campaign in Bangladesh and Europe. The
influence of market liberals translated into the
GoB’s acceptance of the WB’s role in the MDTF
and signing of a concessional loan agreement
between GoB and WB.
4 Contested ideas in climate change planning
This section presents key ideas generated in the
climate change planning process, analysing why
and how different ideas were generated and
contested.
4.1 Specialised vs general development planning
The Planning Commission is the central
planning body in Bangladesh, responsible for
macro- and micro-economic plans and policies,
including the National Five Year Plan and the
Annual Development Plans, while ministries are
responsible for sectoral policy formulation,
planning, evaluation and execution
(Aminuzzaman 2002). However, Bangladesh does
not have any formal process for strategy
development (Chowdhury 2003). Echoing the
central tenet of donor approaches (see Seballos
and Kreft, this IDS Bulletin), planning experts
interviewed in Bangladesh argued that
mainstreaming of climate change should be
achieved through the national planning process
and its institutions. This is to avoid potentially
increasing climate vulnerability through the
development process (‘maladaptation’) and the
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ability to include both climatic and non-climatic
factors in the planning process.
Although BCCSAP acknowledges the
mainstreaming process as a means to address the
multi-sectoral nature of climate change problem,
its location within a sectoral ministry may have
weakened its potential effectiveness in the
central planning process. Interviewed experts
were also concerned about the possibility that
BCCSAP implementation may not go through
the regular national planning appraisal, approval
and financing process. This process may also
potentially be duplicated, given the two different
governance and management infrastructures
under the National Trust Fund and the MDTF
(see Box 1).
4.2 Top-down vs bottom-up process
The BCCSAP has been a largely specialist-driven
process and without involvement of the most
vulnerable communities affected by climate
change (Hossain 2009; Raihan et al. 2010). The
BCCSAP was finalised with three day-long
workshops, separately, with government
ministries, civil society members and donors,
respectively. Such a process was heavily criticised
by the campaign groups, media and politicians.
For example, the current Finance Minister stated
that ‘the representation of the people who are
vulnerable to climate change should be included
in fund management and developing the climate
change strategy paper’ (Daily Star 2008b).
Experts involved claimed that this was due to the
limited time available to produce the initial plan
in only six months: ‘The document could have
been much nuanced and effective had there been
more time for consultation’. This was also
because the DFID finance for the development of
BCCSAP did not include any resources or
guidance on involving these groups in the process.
The limited consultation was also justified in part
because it included the consultative analysis and
studies done during the NAPA preparation in
2005. The interviews also revealed that many
experts and staff of donor agencies considered
that community consultation would not
substantially alter the content, reflecting the
pluralist ideology of policymaking.
4.3 Techno-managerial vs human capacity building
The country’s wealth of development knowledge,
especially in disaster, water and the environment
arena was well represented in narratives of both
climate change and also what should be done to
adapt to its impacts. For example, the post
Hyogo disaster analysis put social and political
aspect of vulnerability at the centre of policy and
practice of disaster risk reduction. Although
engineering solutions to disaster problems have
always been controversial in Bangladesh,
informed interviewees argued that the BCCSAP
should have been built on the past lessons from
infrastructural projects on disaster management,
especially from the Flood Action Plan of the
1990s (Lewis 2010).
4.4 Grant funding vs concessional loan
There was considerable frustration expressed by
government actors and civil society groups alike
that despite political declarations, only limited
climate change funding had reached Bangladesh
up to 2007. Following the huge economic losses
resulting from the 2007 disasters, the GoB and
Bangladesh campaign groups converged around
narratives of claiming compensation for damages
caused by climate change. Some key officials
within the GoB advocated for concessional loans,
fearing that Bangladesh would not receive the
adequate amount of grants (GoB 2009).
However, in the run up to the Copenhagen
negotiations, Foreign Minister Dipu Moni argued
that the Copenhagen conference must agree on
funding grants and not loans (Daily Star 2009),
while newspapers ran another story claiming
that the Economic Relations Department of the
Ministry of Finance was pursuing a loan-based
MDTF sponsored by the WB, despite MoEF
opposition on the grounds that it contradicts
Bangladesh’s stance with the least developed
countries (LDCs) and G77 in the global climate
negotiations (New Age 2008).
4.5 World Bank vs GoB management of climate
change Trust Funds
The communiqué signed between the GoB and
UK states, ‘support will comply with the 2005 Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, aligning it to a
government owned plan through a Bangladesh
Multi Donor Trust Fund… and the UK will
continue to work with GoB and other development
partners to make MDTF operational’ (DFID and
GoB 2008: para. 11). As outlined earlier in this
article, the WB’s involvement as administrator has
been met with significant resistance, and a huge
dispute between the government and sponsoring
donors, overshadowing the discussion on the
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content and process of BCCSAP during its second
and third phases.
5 Further reflections
The Bangladesh experience demonstrates a
number of lessons for the political economy of
climate change planning in both Bangladesh and
other vulnerable countries.
The first lesson relates to the risk of fostering
planning exceptionalism for climate change.
Donor concerns around aid effectiveness and
consequent creation of parallel mechanisms of
planning and implementation may run counter
to both the mainstreaming process and the
alignment of assistance with country priorities
and systems. These may lead to inefficiency and
a lack of transparency and inclusion in those
processes. Donors must ensure that their
funding does not support such duplication, and
the government must integrate climate change
into regular planning and approval processes, at
the same time ensuring that these are made
open and transparent.
Second is the need to relate issues of equity,
recognition and representation to the national
context. While there has been a shift from state
monopoly over planning towards a more
participatory approach, a pluralist perception of
representative government across actors and
interest groups continues to persist among the
policy elites in Bangladesh. As a result, NGO
participation is often assumed to be a substitute
for the involvement of vulnerable communities.
In developing and implementing climate change
plans, a more open and discursive process is
required that permits effective representation of
the wide range of stakeholders concerned.
The third lesson questions the conflicting
incentives of government representatives and
those pursuing an ideology of climate justice.
While the BCCSAP notes in its framing of the
six pillars of action that the needs of the poor
and vulnerable, including women and children,
will be mainstreamed into all activities (MOEF
2009: 27), this is not reinforced within the more
detailed programme descriptions. The role of
NGOs and civil society will be crucial in
advocating developing approaches and holding
government to account for a justice-based
approach that targets those most vulnerable to
the impacts of climate change and least
responsible for its causes.
Finally, the BCCSAP process demonstrates the
need for sufficient time and resources to be
allocated for the design of policy, plans and
programmes to tackle climate change. This
would allow greater levels of dialogue and
participation, as well as learning lessons from
past strategy processes, especially in relation to
the scaling-up of existing interventions. In
particular, the large-scale infrastructural projects
included in the BCCSAP should be critically
examined in light of past lessons from the Flood
Action Plan of the 1990s and Coastal
Embankment Project of the 1960s.
This study had to deal with the challenges of an
issue that is unfolding quickly. With little formal
documentation, the line between facts and
opinion is often blurred and further studies and
dialogue are recommended in two key areas: the
role and influence of business and corporate
interests in the planning process; and the
political economy of the specific programmes of
activity recommended in the BCCSAP.
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